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Pet Ppr, Box 42



Detention Operations: Strategic Offensive in COIN

*Brief to General Petraeus
on the Way Ahead for Detention Operations*

1 JUN 2007

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Agenda

- *Detainee Growth and Capacity: Filling the Gap at US and Iraqi Facilities*
- *Conceptual Overview*
- *Bucca: Controlling Detainee Population in a COIN Environment*
- *FOB Constitution: A New Way of Detention Operations*
- *Taji: Expanding What Works*
- *Al Asad and Q-West: Expeditionary TIFRICs*

Purpose:

- 1) *To gain approval on Bucca upgrades*
- 2) *To gain approval on establishing a TIFRIC at FOB Constitution as proof of concept*
- 3) *To expand the TIFRIC concept to Taji, Al Asad, and Q-West*


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Detainee Releases in OIF




Releases at Theater Internment Facilities by Calendar Year



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Detainee Population by Threat



*The high-risk population grows...
the proportion of "releasable candidates"
shrinks*

Definitions:

LOW RISK

Examples:

LEVEL 1

LEVEL 2

- possession of small arms/ammo
- captured at raid site
- fake ID
- resisting apprehension
- obstructing CF
- associating with AIF
- possession of propaganda

Definitions:

MEDIUM RISK

Examples

LEVEL 3

LEVEL 4

- possession of small arms weapons cache; large ammo store
- counterfeiting, smuggling, creating propaganda
- surveillance of CF; positive explosive test w/o explanation
- inciting ACF activity; communicating a threat
- accomplice/co-conspirator in minor ACF activity

Definitions:

HIGH RISK

Examples


LEVEL 5

LEVEL 6

- weapons dealer/trafficker
- attacking CF
- large weapons cache
- possession of explosives/IED
- foreign fighters/recruiters
- harboring foreign fighters
- Illegal border crossing
- planning/financing attacks
- spying/corruption
- extortion/blackmail
- emplacing IEDs
- murder/kidnapping
- participating in suicide ops
- Involved in NBC ops

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
Detainee Growth in OIF



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Detainee Population by Threat



Total Rated and In Camp: 12,484

Low:	401	3.2%
Medium:	7,030	56.3%
High:	5,053	40.5%

Rating Breakdown:

18,306	Total In Camp (1 Apr 07)
12,484	Rated
1,035	CCCI (Not Rated)
4,787	Not Rated
(Less than 120 days since capture / pending release / blacklist / other)	

Current board: Of 13,000 records reviewed so far...
Only .001% are more than 1 point lower
14% are 1 point lower
84% are same or higher


As of 1 April 2007

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Transfer Criteria – More Detainees to TIF

MOD 1 to MNF-I FRAGO 06-534 (Transfer Criteria to Theater Internment Facilities)




- MOD 1 to MNF-I FRAGO 06-534, dated 1 MAR 07, implemented less restrictive criteria for the transfer of detainees to TIFs
- Average Weekly % of DHA to TIF Intake Prior to 1 Mar: 69.6%
- Average Weekly % of DHA to TIF Intake After 1 Mar: 89.9%

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Population Growth



NOTES:

- 1) Assumes growth of 1900 detainees/month;
Maintaining current linear growth (but w/ few or no releases)
- 2) Assumes sustained surge through Summer '08

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1.4a, 1.4g


Approved for Release

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Iraqi Detention Facilities: Over Capacity

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REPORTED OVERCROWDED DETENTION FACILITIES



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As of 27 May 07

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Iraqi Detention Facilities: Over Capacity



MNC-I Transition Team Inspections and Visits Sample of Iraqi Detention Capacity

27 May 07


- NP– capacity: 675; on-hand: 1,321
 - IA – capacity: 1,944; on-hand: 1,752
 - IP – capacity: 5,796; on-hand: 4,856
- 8,415 7,929

Only 486 Available Spaces

Notes on Data: Capacity estimates are subject to significant missing data


- Only facilities associated with a transition team are tracked
- 360 IPS stations are not associated with PTTs
- 78% of Transition Teams reported with a total of 7,929 detainees in pretrial

TIF Detainees by Capture Location and Iraqi Facilities Over Capacity



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Population Growth – The Unknowns



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Maintaining current linear growth (but w/ few or no releases)
- 2) Assumes sustained surge through Summer '08

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Bucca: Losing Control



2006-2007
cost to
recover
from four
TIF fires:
\$2,579,471



AS OF: 1 JUN 07 SLIDE 15

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
POC at TF 1.4 J3,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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Bucca: How Big is Too Big?



What about ICOs?

The 1000 ICOs at Bucca could replace 2 US MP companies and control approximately four moderate compounds... less than $\frac{1}{4}$ the size of Bucca today. An assumed risk given the communal design

*Doctrinally and practically...
Bucca now too big for effective Iraqi or US control*

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Detention Operations in Counterinsurgency



COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE COMPOUNDS

FIGHT THE WAR ON OUR TERMS

TF 1.4a will attack
vulnerabilities in compounds:
Deny networking,
recruitment, Sharia Courts,
escapes, and violence



Extremist Detainee Vulnerabilities

(source: FM 3-24)

Secrecy
Mobilization
Base of operations
Financial weakness
Internal division
Maintaining momentum
Informants

TIFs will cease to be
"terrorist training camps":
Empower TIF Commanders,
isolate detainee leaders,
restrict movement, maintain
moral high ground, and GAIN
CONTROL



Mobilization of Extremism **in Detainees**

(source: FM 3-24)

Persuasion
Coercion
Reaction to abuses
Foreign support
Apolitical reasons
(e.g., money/crime)